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Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept 
of intellectual property?
1. Introduction
In 1785 Immanuel Kant wrote a short essay,  Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des 
Büchernachdrucks,  which  is  sometimes  translated  as  Of  the  injustice  of 
counterfeiting  books;1 later,  he  repeated  almost  the  same  thesis  in  the 
Rechtslehre, § 31, II, within Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). As most scholars, 
in  the  field  of  humanities,  take  intellectual  property  for  granted,  the 
representation  of  Kant  like  an  intellectual  property  forerunner  is  still  a 
commonplace.2 
According to Kant's Architectonic of Pure Reason the philosopher is closer to a 
lawgiver than to an artificer, if  philosophy is considered in its  Weltbegriff or 
cosmopolitan concept (AA.03:  542.23-30). Because such a lawgiving is based 
upon that reason with which every human being is endowed, the laws of reason 
should be thought as public laws and not as individual, private creations. How 
could a public law be consistently viewed as an object of private intellectual 
property?
Kant avoids such a contradiction because his justification of authors' right does 
not rely on intellectual property, but on the meaning and the function of both 
authors and publishers in the world of the public use of reason. Therefore, as it 
has been already shown,3 Kant's  theory of  copyright is  compatible with the 
Weltbegriff of philosophy. Furthermore, more interestingly, it is also possible to 
demonstrate that it is consistent with his general theory of property, as stated 
in the Metaphysik der Sitten.  
The following essay, after presenting a short sketch of Kant's authors right as 
personal  right,  will  introduce  Fichte's  theory  of  intellectual  property  to 
strengthen the case of Kant's rejection of intellectual property, by comparing 
his ideas with the theory of an actual intellectual property advocate, like Fichte. 
Eventually, to read the proposed interpretation of Kant in a wider theoretical 
perspective, it will attempt to connect it to his general theory of property of the 
Metaphysik der Sitten.
1 The  Cambridge  University  site  Primary  Sources  on  copyright  (1450-1900) 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/htdocs/index.html> translates it,  more accurately,  as  On 
the Unlawfulness of Reprinting.
2 See  for  instance  W.W.  Fisher  III,  Theories  of  Intellectual  Property 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf>, in S- Munzer, ed., New Essays in 
the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001)  M. Borghi, 
Writing  Practices  in  the  Privilege  -  and  Intellectual  Property  -  Systems,  Social  Science 
Research  Network  Working  Paper  Series,  2003  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031639>. 
Besides, see the critical review of M.C. Pievatolo to R. Pozzo (a cura di), I. Kant, J.G. Fichte, 
J.A.H. Reimarus,  L'autore e i suoi diritti. Scritti polemici sulla proprietà intellettuale, Milano, 
Biblioteca  di  via  Senato,  2005.  ReF  -  Recensioni  filosofiche (nuova  serie),  5.  2006 
<http://archiviomarini.sp.unipi.it/42/>.  According to R. Pozzo, both Kant and Fichte can be 
viewed as intellectual property forerunners, so that its idea has to be connected to – and 
ennobled by – the very flower of German Enlightenment. It is perhaps worth mentioning 
that the president of the Biblioteca di via Senato is Marcello Dell'Utri, a senior advisor of the 
powerful Italian politician and media oligopolist Silvio Berlusconi. 
3 See M.C. Pievatolo, Publicness and Private Intellectual Property in Kant's Political Thought in 
Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 
hrsg.  von  Valerio  Rohden,  Ricardo  R.  Terra,  Guido  A.  de  Almeida  u.  Margit  Ruffing,  de 
Gruyter, Berlin New York 2008 Bd. 4, pp. 631–641.
2. Kant: authors right as a personal right
In Kant's age, the word Nachdruck,4 sometimes translated as “counterfeiting” o 
“piracy”, had the proper and less criminal meaning of "reprinting". The United 
Kingdom had passed in 1710 the first European copyright bill, the Statute of 
Anne,5 which  received  a  definitive  interpretation  only  in  1774,  in  the  well-
known judgment on Donaldson vs. Beckett6 settled by the House of Lords. In 
Germany,  on  the  contrary,  the  continuation  of  the  early  modern  privilege7 
regime and the multitude of states and jurisdictions facilitated the practice of 
the Nachdruck by further printers after the first publication. And it was highly 
controversial  whether such a practice were rightful  or should be considered 
piracy.
The debate on the Nachdruck was not restricted to publishers and lawyers: as 
the  Enlightenment  intellectuals  were  aware  of  the  political  importance  of 
disseminating  knowledge,  major  thinkers  like  Lessing,  Kant,  Fichte,  Diderot, 
Condorcet took part to it. The concept of intellectual property was not taken for 
granted, even because of a strong European Roman Law tradition, according to 
which property is only possible on material, touchable things – the so-called res 
quae tangi possunt.8  The res quae tangi possunt are excludable and rivalrous; 
therefore they present us with the question of who is entitled to use them. On 
the other hand, the incorporeal, spiritual things do not need private property 
because they can be indefinitely shared among everyone.
Kant closes his 1785 essay by asserting his endorsement to the Roman Law 
tradition: 
If the idea of book publishing as such which was taken as the basis for the above arguments 
were to be understood properly and (as I flatter myself to think it feasible) if it were to be 
elaborated with the requisite elegance of Roman juridical scholarship, then actions against 
reprinters could very well be brought before the courts without it being necessary to apply 
beforehand for a new law to be promulgated in this respect.9
If Kant's statement has to be taken seriously, he should not be considered as 
4 Check  its  definition  <http://germazope.uni-
trier.de/Projects/WBB/woerterbuecher/dwb/wbgui?lemid=GN00274>  in  J.  Grimm  and  W. 
Grimm. Deutsches Wörterbuch, Lepzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-1960 , now at <http://germa83.uni-
trier.de/DWB/welcome.htm>.
5 The Statute copyright was no longer a grant from the crown: it was recognized as an original 
right of the author. It was limited in time, with a 21 years term for all works already in print 
at the time of its enactment and a 14 years term for all works published subsequently.
6 See  Donaldson v. Beckett. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property, 
February 4 through February 22, 1774, in K.-E, Tallmo,  The History of Copyright: A Critical  
Overview  With  Source  Texts  in  Five  Languages at 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.com/donaldson.html>
7 The major difference between copyright and privilege is that the former is a universal right, 
while the latter depends on a grant from the Crown. The former, in other words, is due to 
every author, while the latter derives from a decision of the political power.
8 In the “battle of the booksellers” that raged in England for more than half a century, Roman 
Law  tradition  was  an  important  landmark.  While  the  English  booksellers  argued  that 
copyright  was  a  common  law  property,  therefore  unlimited  and  perpetual,  the  Scottish 
booksellers recognized only the Statute of Anne terms on the basis of the Scottish Roman 
Law tradition that denied the very possibility of property on immaterial objects.
9 I Kant, Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, AA.8, 87:09-14. The translation is 
by Luis Sundkvist, adapted from John Richardson's anonymous translation of 1799, now in 
Cambridge  University  site  Primary  Sources  on  copyright  (1450-1900) 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/htdocs/index.html>.
an intellectual property forerunner. He reshapes the Roman Law tradition in an 
original way, which anticipates the continental concept of authors' moral rights.
According to Kant, a book can be seen: 
- as a material object (1) 
- as a means of conveying thoughts (2) 
- as a speech (3)
1. The book as a material object may be reprinted. It becomes a property of 
whoever buys it.  For  the very principle  of  private property,  it  is  not  fair  to 
restrain the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it.10 
2.  The  Nachdruck, on the other hand, does not prevent anyone to keep on 
conceiving his thoughts. They remain a "property" of their author, regardless of 
their  reproduction,  because they are  not  material:  properly  speaking,  ideas 
cannot be stolen. 11
3. A speech is an action (Handlung)12. A person who is speaking to a public is 
not  selling  anything  to  them:  he  is  engaging  a  relationship  with  them. 
Therefore, such a relation is not a matter of rights on things (iura realia), but of 
personal rights (iura personalia).
In the Metaphysik der Sitten, we can find a clear distinction between ius reale 
and  ius personale.  The ius reale  or  ius in re is a right on things.13 The  ius 
personale is  defined as the "possession of  another's choice [Willkür],  in the 
sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed”.14 In 
other words, it is a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. 
As moral subjectivity involves freedom, personal rights cannot be established 
without the concerned persons' consent. 
According  to  Kant,  the  ius  reale cannot  be  applied  to  ideas,  or,  better,  to 
thoughts,  because  they  can  be  conceived  by  everyone  at  the  same  time, 
without  depriving  their  authors.  Surprising  as  it  may  seem,  the  ius  reale 
protects  the  freedom to  copy,  if  it  is  taken seriously.   If  a  thing  has  been 
purchased  in  a  legal  transaction  and  the  purchasers  copy  it  by  their  own 
means, they are simply working on their legitimate private property.  For the 
very principle of private property, it is not fair to restrain the ways in which its 
legitimate purchaser may use it. 
For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book 
as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is 
his  book.  Furthermore,  in  Kant's  opinion,  we  cannot  derive  any  affirmative 
personal obligation from a ius reale:15 a ius personale on someone cannot be 
claimed by simply purchasing some related things without obtaining his or her 
expressed consent.
Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius 
personale  only. By using such a strategy, he concludes that the unauthorized 
printer has to be compared to an unauthorized spokesperson rather than to a 
thief. Therefore, it is not necessary to go beyond the Roman law tradition, by 
inventing a new ius reale on immaterial things.
Kant's  argument  goes  as  follows:  when  I  speak  to  a  public,  I  engage  a 
relationship with them.  The book may be viewed as a medium through which 
authors can transmit their speeches to a wider public. In the age of printing, 
10 VUB , AA.08 79:10-13.
11 Ibidem, AA.08 79:08-10
12 Ibidem, AA.08 85-86.
13 §11, MS, AA.06 260:. The English translations from the Metaphysik der Sitten are by M. Gregor: I. Kant, 
The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1996. 
14 §18, MS, AA.06  271:04-10.
15 VUB , AA.08 83.
such a  medium used to be provided by publishers.  Thus publishers  can be 
considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. But, as 
such, they need the authors' authorization.16 Why? Because to speak in the 
name of another without his authorization is like engaging him in a relationship 
without his consent. As personal rights, according to Kant, concern relations 
among free beings, they can arise only from expressed agreements.  Hence, 
the unauthorized printer is like an unauthorized spokesperson, who produces a 
relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it.
However, the scope of Kant's justification of copyright is very narrow: it applies 
only to the publishing of  texts, it does not touch th so-called derivative works, 
and it is justified only as far as it helps the public to get the texts.
Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke 
or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or 
operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can 
derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce 
them and may donate or sell the copies to others.17 Every time an object can 
be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he wants with 
it,  because of  his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both sides. 
Moreover, as the injustice of reprinting books depends on their communication 
to the public, we can deduce that their reproduction for personal use is not to 
be forbidden.
As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, 
retouches  or  translates  the  book  of  another,  he  produces  a  new  speech, 
although the thoughts can be the same  Therefore, such works cannot be seen 
as  Nachdruck and  are  perfectly  lawful.18 In  other  words,in  a  Kantian 
environment, everyone may become a “wreader” - a reader and writer at the 
same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions
The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying 
his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the 
latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse 
to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it 
himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated or spurious works, nor 
print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand.  If the publisher 
does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish.19 In a Kantian 
environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help authors to 
reach the public. Copyright should be neither censorship nor monopoly.
In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher 
should be exclusive20 because the publisher becomes willing to publish a book 
only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is interested in 
avoiding competition.  But later, in the  Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not 
mention the exclusivity requirement at all,  perhaps because he has realized 
that it  was based on an empirical  contamination,  depending on the current 
state of technology. 
In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest 
distribution  of  ideas.  Printing  required  both  specific  tools  and  skills,  and 
specialized  and centralized  organizations.  And  as  long  as  the  publishers  of 
printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, 
16 VUB, AA.08  79-82.
17 Ibidem, AA.08 85-86.
18 Ibidem, AA.08 86-87.
19 Ibidem, AA.08 85.
20 Ibidem, AA.08 81.
Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. 
However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an 
author  should  be  entitled  to  authorize  everyone  to  distribute  his  work  to 
everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. Such a 
practice is now fairly usual on the Internet, when authors choose a  Creative 
Commons  License  and  grant  the  right  to  publish  their  works  to  everyone, 
because they are interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In 
Kant's  times  such  a  strategy  would  hardly  be  paying  because  the  major 
publication  technology,  the  press,  was  not  cheap  and  easy  like  the  digital 
reproduction of texts, but difficult and expensive. 
Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an 
intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it 
has  the  author's  consent.  Where  the  intermediation  is  not  necessary  any 
longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no 
sense.21
3. A term of comparison: Fichte's theory of intellectual property
In 1793 the “Berlinische Monatschrift” published a short essay,  Proof of the 
Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable,22 written by Fichte two years 
ago. The essay connects originality to intellectual property and advocates the 
enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning 
the final  parable by means of  which Fichte illustrates his  thesis,  because it 
contains in itself all our commonplaces on intellectual property.
In  the time of  the Caliph  Harun al  Rashid,  an alchemist  used to  prepare  a 
beneficial  drug  and  to  entrust  the  commercial  side  of  the  business  to  a 
merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a 
goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from 
the  monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him 
before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling 
the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society 
at  large.  What  was  the  judgment  of  the  Caliph?  “He  had  the  useful  man 
hanged.”23  
To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, 
but had materially stolen it.  Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In 
the  18th century,  however,  Fichte  had  to  demonstrate  the  commonplace  of 
today.
According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book:
- its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper
- its ideational aspect (das geistige)
The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into:
- a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; 
- the form of these ideas, i. e. the way  in which they are presented.
21 In a Kantian environment, controversial sites like The Pirate Bay, as they are only facilitating 
people  to  copy  materials  for  their  personal  use,  should  not  be  seen  as  a  "pirate" 
Nachdrucker.
22An  English  translation  by  Martha  Woodmansee  can  be  downloaded  at  the  URL 
<http://www.case.edu/affil/sce/authorship/Fichte,_Proof.doc>
23 J.G. Fichte, Beweis, p. 482.
All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can 
buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, 
appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it 
is self-evident that "we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of 
which by another is physically impossible".24 As the form can be only mine, the 
author  is  the  proprietor  of  his  text  and  his  authorized  publisher  is  its 
usufructuary.
However sophistical this shift from originality to property may seem, it is not 
the  only  seminal  element  of  our  commonplaces  on  copyright  contained  in 
Fichte's essay. It is also worth remarking that in the Harun al Rashid parable the 
alchemist - the author -  transfer his rights and disappears from the scene; the 
most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the 
other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but 
his  arguments  are  rejected  as  criminal;  as  regards  as  the  Caliph  -  the 
government -, he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; 
and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is 
out of all proportion. 
The young Fichte believed that his ideas on authors' right were similar to the 
ones  of  Kant.25 However,  there  are  at  least  three  outstanding  differences 
between Kant and Fichte:
1.  Fichte  bases  copyright  on  the  individual  originality  in  the  form  of 
expression;26 Kant does not mention originality at all; 
2.  Fichte  equates  copyright  with  private  property;27 Kant  rejects  the  very 
possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale;
3. Fichte thinks that copyright violators deserve the same harsh punishment of 
thieves.28 According  to  Kant,  the  unauthorized  printer  should  simply 
compensate  all  the  damages  he  caused to  the  author  or  to  his  authorized 
publisher.29
While  Fichte  is  an  intellectual  property  endorser,  Kant  is  an  “enlightened” 
conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization 
trend.  He  accepts  the  copyright  principle,  according  to  which  authors  are 
entitled to decide how to  publish their  works.  The rights  of  the publishers, 
however,  are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, 
while the personal use of the texts and the so-called “wreading” should remain 
free.  And, above all,  all  that can be viewed as a product is,  in his  opinion, 
outside the scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions.
What is, in any, the philosophical meaning of Kant's "conservatism"? To answer 
such a question,  we need to link his  ideas on authors'  right  to his  general 
theory of property, as it is explained in the Metaphysics of Morals.  
24  J.G. Fichte, Beweis, pp. 446 ff.
25 J.G. Fichte, Beweis, ftn. 1. According to Fichte Kant did not intend the opera as an action, but 
as something determined by the author's spiritual form.  
26 Ibidem, p. 1.
27 Ibidem, p. 1.
28 Ibidem, pp. 8-10.
29 I. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die 
Praxis, AA.08 80.
4. What is a thing?
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of 
real rights  are only corporeal entities or  res corporales: "Sache ist ein Ding, 
was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches 
selbst  der  Freiheit  ermangelt,  heiß  daher  Sache  (res  corporalis)".30 
Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate 
to incorporeal things as well.  
According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished 
from  its  sensible  possession.  Something  external  would  be  rightfully  mine 
"only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even 
though I am not in possession of it" (AA.06 245:13-16). The rightful possession 
is an intelligible, not sensible, relation.  I can claim that my bicycle is mine only 
if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the 
backyard. 
Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property  as 
explained in his 1793 essay,  according to which we are the rightful owners of a 
thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this 
reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author 
to claim a rightful property on his work. 
Is  it  really  so  obvious  that  originality  implies  property?  Property  is  a 
comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all  the time 
over  the  use  of  material  objects.  It  is  so  comfortable  just  because  it  is 
physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property 
when  something  cannot  be  separated  from someone.   I  say  both  that  my 
fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But 
these  two  "mine"  have  a  different  meaning:  the  former  is  the  "mine"  of 
attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property.  The former can be used to 
identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is 
related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation 
with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. 
It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by 
attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no 
one can steal it: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if 
Fichte's  principle  were  the  only  justification  of  property  right,  it  would 
undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my 
bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be 
entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right 
cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations.  
Although  he  defines  things  as  res  corporales,  Kant  determines  the  rightful 
possession  of  a  thing  as  a  possession  without  detentio,  by  ignoring  all  its 
sensible facets.  Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - 
is  exerted on an object  that  is  "merely  distinct  from me",  regardless  of  its 
position  in  space  and  time.  Space  and  time,  indeed,  are  sensible 
determinations  and  should  be  left  out  of  consideration.  According  to  the 
postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a 
permissive law of reason:31 if  a rightful  possession were not possible,  every 
30 "A thing is that to which nothing can be imputed. Any object of free choice which itself lacks 
freedom is therefore called a thing (res corporalis)" (AA.06, 223). 
31See B. Tierney, Kant on Property: The Problem of Permissive Law, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 62(2), 2001, pp. 301-312 and Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant, 
Journal of the History of Ideas 62(3), 2001, pp. 381-399.
object would be a  res nullius and nobody would be entitled to use it.
Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same 
time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being 
distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res 
corporales.
Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being 
disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, 249:5-
7).  If  property  is  a merely  intelligible  relation with an object  that  is  simply 
distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might 
be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, 
does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it?
According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of 
personal  rights.  A  person  who  is  speaking  to  the  people  is  engaging  a 
relationship  with  them;  if  someone else  engages  such a  relationship  in  his 
name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with 
property: he is only an agent without authority.  Speeches, by Kant, cannot be 
separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised  land of intellectual 
property without entering it. 
According to Kant, before the acquired rights,  everyone has a moral capacity 
for putting others under obligation  that he calls innate right or internal  meum 
vel tuum  (AA.06,  237:24-25).  The  innate  right  is  only  one:  freedom  as 
independence  from  being  constrained  by  another's  choice,  insofar  it  can 
coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. 
Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of  his  humanity:  in other 
words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the 
very  possibility  condition  of  law.  Freedom  implies  innate  equality,  "that  is, 
independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind 
them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well 
as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs  any 
act affecting rights  he has done no wrong to anyone,  and finally  his  being 
authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself  diminish what is 
theirs,  so  long  as  they  do  not  want  to  accept  it  -  such  things  as  merely 
communicating his thoughts to them." (AA.06, 237-238)32
In spite of his intellectual theory of property,33 Kant does not enter in the realm 
of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an 
important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without 
suppressing freedom itself.  If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic 
element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to 
mix copyright protection and censorship. 
Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and 
rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used.  We cannot, 
however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that 
need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from 
speeches would be like excluding them from freedom.
Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the 
32 Italics added.
33See H. Williams, Metaphysical and not just political,  "ECPR general conference" (September 
2007)
scope of  copyright to publishing,  or,  better,  to the publishing of  the age of 
print: the  Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without 
the author's  permission and distributes  its  copies to the public.  If  someone 
copies  a  book  for  his  personal  use,  or  lets  others  do  it,  or  translates  and 
elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved 
any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. 
The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element 
of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone.  Kant does not stick to 
the  Roman  Law  tradition  because  of  conservatism,  but  because  of 
Enlightenment.34 
34A  version  of  this  article  has  been  rejected  by  the  organizing  committee  of  the  XI. 
Internationaler  Kant-Kongress  with  the  following  motivations:  “Siamo  spiacenti  di 
comunicarle che il contributo non è stato accettato per la presentazione all’XI Congresso 
Kantiano Internazionale. In considerazione dell’altissimo numero di contributi pervenuti, che 
ha reso necessaria una selezione molto rigorosa, la decisione del Comitato organizzativo non 
va intesa come un giudizio assolutamente negativo sul Suo lavoro, ma soltanto come una 
valutazione comparativa.” One of the Italian members of the organizing committee is also 
the author of the book  L'autore e i suoi diritti. Scritti polemici sulla proprietà intellettuale 
whose interpretation of Kant I criticized in the above mentioned book review (note 2). But, 
obviously, this is only an unfortunate coincidence.
